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For the third time in a short period, the European Court of Human Rights has found that the 
Netherlands authorities have disrespected the right of journalists to protect their sources. Since 
the judgment in the Voskuil case (ECHR 22 November 2007) and especially since the Grand 
Chamber judgment in the Sanoma case (ECHR 14 September 2010, see also ECHR Blog) it has 
become clear that the legal framework in the Netherlands and some of the practices by its 
public authorities are not sufficiently guaranteeing the right of journalists to protect their 
sources.  
In the judgment of 22 November 2012 in the case of Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke 
Media B.V. and Others v. the Netherlands (Appl. No. 39315/06), the Court is of the opinion 
that the telephone tapping and surveillance of two journalists by the Netherlands security and 
intelligence services lacked a sufficient legal basis as the law did not provide safeguards 
appropriate to the use of powers of surveillance against journalists with a view to discovering 
their journalistic sources. There has therefore been a violation of Articles 8 and 10 of the 
Convention (§ 102). Also an order to surrender leaked documents belonging to the security and 
intelligence services is considered as a violation of the journalists’ rights as guaranteed by 
Article 10 of the Convention. The Court is of the opinion that the Netherlands authorities could 
not provide relevant and sufficient reasons to justify the interference with the journalists’ rights 
in this case. According to the Court, there was no “overriding requirement in the public 
interest” justifying the order to surrender the documents (§ 131-132). 
The ruling of the European Court in De Telegraaf case does also have consequences outside the 
Netherlands. The judgment implicates that intelligence and security services in each of the 47 
member states of the European Convention cannot interfere with the rights of journalists to 
have their sources protected under Article 10 of the Convention, unless an overriding 
requirement in the public interest can pertinently justify such an interference. Any coercive 
measures against journalist must be prescribed by law in a sufficiently precise and transparent 
way and effective procedural safeguards must exist to protect journalists against abuse of 
power by secret services. Most importantly, the Court confirms that the procedural guarantee 
of an ex ante review by a judge or another independent body is also applicable to targeted 
  
surveillance or telephone tapping of journalists undertaken by security and intelligence 
authorities. A review post factum, whether by a Supervisory Board, a Parliamentary Committee 
on the Intelligence and Security Services or the National Ombudsman cannot restore the 
confidentiality of journalistic sources once it is destroyed. As a consequence of this judgment, 
the legal framework and the operational practices of many security and intelligence services in 
Europe will need to be modified, in order to guarantee the rights of journalists under Article 10 
of the Convention. Without guarantees of an ex ante review by a judge or an independent 
body, coercive measures against journalists by security and intelligence services are inevitably 
to be considered as breaches of the rights of journalists covered by Article 10. 
The facts 
The case concerns the actions taken by the domestic authorities against two journalists, De 
Haas and Mos, of the national daily newspaper De Telegraaf after having published articles 
about the Netherlands secret service AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst – 
General Intelligence and Security Service) suggesting that highly secret information had been 
leaked to the criminal circuit, and more precisely to the drugs mafia. The journalists were 
ordered by the National Police International Investigation Department to surrender documents 
pertaining to the secret services’ activities. The two journalists had also been subject to 
telephone tapping and observation by AIVD agents. Their applications in court regarding these 
measures failed, as well at the level of the Regional Court in The Hague as at the level of the 
Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). According to the domestic courts, neither the order to surrender 
the documents nor the telephone tapping and observations violated the right to protect 
sources covered by Article 10 of the European Convention. It has been argued – both in a 
decision of the Minister of the Interior and a report from the Supervisory Board of the 
Intelligence and Security Services – that the use of special powers against the journalists was 
lawful and necessary in a democracy. It was emphasized that the AIVD investigation was 
intended to make an assessment of the leaked AIVD-files and, within that framework, it was 
considered necessary and proportionate to use special powers against the journalists in 
possession of the leaked files. Also the phone tapping was considered to meet the criteria of 
necessity, proportionality and subsidiarity. 
When later questioned as witnesses in criminal proceedings against persons suspected of 
leaking secret AIVD information, the two journalists refused to answer the questions before the 
investigative judge, arguing that the judicial order to reveal information might lead to the 
identification of the person from whom they had received secret AIVD documents. As the 
journalists at a later hearing before the investigative judge persisted in their refusal to answer 
his questions, they were detained in prison for failure to comply with a judicial order to reveal 
information. A few days later however the journalist were released by judgment of the Regional 
  
Court of The Hague recognizing the importance of the protection of journalistic sources. The 
Regional Court also found that no issue of State security could arise since the availability of the 
documents outside the AIVD had been common knowledge in the media. 
The complaint in Strasbourg 
Relying on Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and Article 10 (freedom of 
expression and information), the publishing company of De Telegraaf and the two journalists 
De Haas and Mos together with the Netherlands Association of Journalists (Nederlandse 
Vereniging van Journalisten) and the Netherlands Society of Editors-in-Chief (Nederlands 
Genootschap van Hoofdredacteuren) complained in Strasbourg about the order to surrender 
documents which may identify journalistic sources and about the use of special powers by the 
Netherlands authorities organizing telephone tapping and surveillance. They argued that the 
use of special powers against the journalists, who were not themselves “targets”, could not be 
covered by section 6 § 2, a, of the Intelligence and Security Services Act and therefore lacked 
the basis in law required by the second paragraphs of Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention. 
Conversely, be it the case that the two journalists were in fact “targets”, then the domestic 
courts would wrongly have held the interest in the protection of journalistic sources to be 
outweighed by the interest of State security, again in violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
Art. 6 § 2, a, of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act stipulates that the AIVD can carry 
out investigations “relative to organisations and persons who, by the aims which they pursue or 
their activities, give rise to serious suspicion that they constitute a danger to the continued 
existence of the democratic legal order or to the security or other weighty interests of the 
State”. 
In a partial decision on the admissibility, the third section of the Court decided on 18 May 2010 
(Appl. No. 39315/06) to declare the application by the Netherlands Association of Journalists 
and the Netherlands Society of Editors-in-Chief inadmissible, as these applicant-associations had 
not themselves been affected by the matters complained of under Articles 8 and 10 of the 
Convention. Consequently, neither association could claim to be a ‘victim’ of a violation of 
these provisions in the sense of Article 34 of the Convention (compare ECtHR decision of 25 
June 2002 in the case of Martine Ernst et autres v. Belgique (Appl. No. 33400/96) also declaring, 
for the same reason, the application of the General Association of Professional Journalists of 
Belgium inadmissible ratione personae). 
The Court’s judgment 
The Court makes a separate analysis of the use of special powers by the AIVD against the 
journalists on the one hand, and the order to surrender the documents on the other hand. The 
  
first issue on the use of the special powers is undoubtedly the most important and interesting 
one. 
The Court disagrees with the argument of the Netherlands’ Government disputing the 
journalists’ position that the protection of journalistic sources was in issue. According to the 
Government, the AIVD resorted to the use of special powers not to establish the identity of the 
journalists’ sources of information, but solely to identify the AIVD staff member who had leaked 
the documents. The Court’s understanding of the concept of a journalistic “source” is indeed a 
broader one, referring to “any person who provides information to a journalist”. The Court 
understands “information identifying a source” to include both “the factual circumstances of 
acquiring information from a source by a journalist” and “the unpublished content of the 
information provided by a source to a journalist” as far as they are likely to lead to the 
identification of a source. Therefore, the Court finds that the AIVD sought, by the use of its 
special powers, to circumvent the protection of a journalistic source (§ 86-87). As the issues of 
privacy protection and telephone tapping under Article 8 are intertwined with the Article 10 
issue, the Court finds it appropriate to consider the matter under Articles 8 and 10 
concurrently. 
 
The next question is whether the interference with the journalists’ right is in accordance or 
prescribed by law. The Court reiterates its case-law according to which the expression “in 
accordance with the law” not only requires the impugned measure to have some basis in 
domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be 
accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects. The law must be 
compatible with the rule of law, which means that it must provide a measure of legal protection 
against arbitrary interference by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by Article 8 § 1 
and Article 10 § 1. The risks of arbitrariness are evident – especially in cases as this, where a 
power of the executive is exercised in secret.  
According to the Court, the legal provisions regarding the special powers of the AIVD were 
accessible and foreseeable. The journalists could not reasonably be unaware that the 
information, which had fallen into their hands, was authentic, classified information that had 
unlawfully been removed from the keeping of the AIVD and that publishing this information 
was likely to provoke action aimed at discovering its provenance. The crucial issue is, however, 
that the status as journalists required special safeguards to ensure adequate protection of their 
journalistic sources. The Court is of the opinion that the present case is characterized by the 
targeted surveillance of journalists in order to determine from whence they have obtained their 
information (§ 97). Furthermore, in the field of security and intelligence services where abuse is 
potentially so easy in individual cases and could have such harmful consequences for a 
democratic society as a whole, it is in principle desirable to entrust supervisory control to a 
  
judge. The Court refers to its finding in the Sanoma case, which involved a disclosure order of 
journalistic sources that was given by a public prosecutor. In that case, the Grand Chamber 
emphasized the necessity of the “ex ante”-character of independent review by a judge, a court 
or another independent body, as the police or a public prosecutor cannot be considered to be 
objective and impartial so as to make the necessary assessment of the various competing 
interests. Judicial review post factum could not cure these failings, since it could not prevent 
the disclosure of the identity of the journalistic sources from the moment when this 
information came into the hands of the public prosecutor and the police. 
The Court applies this approach also in the instant case, as the use of special powers against the 
journalists appeared to have been authorised by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations, if not by the head of the AIVD or even a subordinate AIVD official, but in any case 
without prior review by an independent body with the power to prevent or terminate 
it. Moreover, review post factum, whether by the Supervisory Board, the Parliamentary 
Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services or the National Ombudsman cannot 
restore the confidentiality of journalistic sources once it is destroyed. For these reasons, the 
Court finds that the law did not provide safeguards appropriate to the use of powers of 
surveillance against journalists with a view to discovering their journalistic sources. There has 
therefore been a violation of Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention (§ 100-102). 
Regarding the second issue, the Court agrees that the order to surrender the leaked documents 
to the AIVD was prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim (‘national security’ and 
‘prevention of crime’), but it estimates the interference with the right of journalists to protect 
their sources in casu not necessary in a democratic society. Referring to its case law since 
Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (1996), an interference with a journalist’s sources can only be 
justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest. In its reasoning the  Court also 
emphasized that the conduct of the source can never be decisive in determining whether a 
disclosure order ought to be made but will merely operate as one, albeit important, factor to be 
taken into consideration in carrying out the balancing exercise required under Article 10 § 2. As 
none of the reasons invoked by the AIVD are considered relevant and sufficient by the 
European Court, the conclusion is that the order to surrender the documents was not justified 
and that this interference amounted to a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.  
Comment 
 
The judgment in De Telegraaf case and the finding of a double violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention, both regarding the order to surrender the documents as with regard the coercive 
measures by the AIVD against the journalists, are fully consistent with the Court’s earlier case 
law applying Article 10 in cases of protection of journalists’ sources. 
  
 
In the Sanoma case, the Court in its Grand Chamber judgment of 14 September 2010 
emphasized the importance of source protection based on Article 10 of the Convention, noting 
that “orders to disclose sources potentially have a detrimental impact, not only on the source, 
whose identity may be revealed, but also on the newspaper or other publication against which 
the order is directed, whose reputation may be negatively affected in the eyes of future 
potential sources by the disclosure, and on members of the public, who have an interest in 
receiving information imparted through anonymous sources” (§ 89). In the judgment of 22 
November 2012 in the case of Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. and Others v. 
the Netherlands, the European Court reiterates that “protection of journalistic sources is one of 
the basic conditions for press freedom, as is recognised and reflected in various international 
instruments including the Committee of Ministers Recommendation (..). Without such 
protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public on matters 
of public interest. As a result the vital public-watchdog role of the press may be undermined and 
the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected. 
Having regard to the importance of the protection of journalistic sources for press freedom in a 
democratic society and the potentially chilling effect an order of source disclosure has on the 
exercise of that freedom, such a measure cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the 
Convention unless it is justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest” (§ 127). 
It would have been very surprising if the Court had neglected these principles in a case 
concerning the interference with journalists’ sources by security and intelligence services. As 
the Grand Chamber has explicitly stated in Sanoma v. the Netherlands on 14 September 2010, 
procedural safeguards proscribed by law should inherently be part of the protection of 
journalistic sources in application of Article 10 ECHR. According to the Court, “first and foremost 
among these safeguards is the guarantee of review by a judge or other independent and 
impartial decision-making body” (§ 90). The Court is of the opinion that “given the preventive 
nature of such review the judge or other independent and impartial body must thus be in a 
position to carry out this weighing of the potential risks and respective interests prior to any 
disclosure and with reference to the material that it is sought to have disclosed so that the 
arguments of the authorities seeking the disclosure can be properly assessed” (§ 90). The Grand 
Chamber emphasized that “the requisite review should be carried out by a body separate from 
the executive and other interested parties, invested with the power to determine whether a 
requirement in the public interest overriding the principle of protection of journalistic sources 
exists prior to the handing over of such material and to prevent unnecessary access to 
information capable of disclosing the sources' identity if it does not” (§ 90). It is clear in the 
Court's view, “that the exercise of any independent review that only takes place subsequently to 
the handing over of material capable of revealing such sources would undermine the very 
essence of the right to confidentiality” (§ 91). The Court continued in Sanoma to emphasize the 
  
necessity of the “ex ante”-character of such independent review: “Given the preventive nature 
of such review the judge or other independent and impartial body must thus be in a position to 
carry out this weighing of the potential risks and respective interests prior to any disclosure and 
with reference to the material that it is sought to have disclosed so that the arguments of the 
authorities seeking the disclosure can be properly assessed. The decision to be taken should be 
governed by clear criteria, including whether a less intrusive measure can suffice to serve the 
overriding public interests established. It should be open to the judge or other authority to 
refuse to make a disclosure order or to make a limited or qualified order so as to protect sources 
from being revealed, whether or not they are specifically named in the withheld material, on the 
grounds that the communication of such material creates a serious risk of compromising the 
identity of journalist's sources (..). In situations of urgency, a procedure should exist to identify 
and isolate, prior to the exploitation of the material by the authorities, information that could 
lead to the identification of sources from information that carries no such risk” (§ 92). 
 
The Court has now in its judgment of 22 November 2012 fully applied this approach in relation 
to coercive measures by the security and intelligence services. As a consequence of this 
judgment, the legal framework and the operational practices of many security and intelligence 
services in Europe will need to be modified. Without guarantees of an ex ante review by a judge 
or an independent body, coercive measures such as telephone tapping, registration of 
telecommunications or other forms of surveillance of journalists by security and intelligence 
services are inevitably to be considered as breaches of the rights of journalists covered by 
Article 10.  An ex ante judicial review is  necessary to guarantee that the reasons invoked by 
security and intelligence services to have access to journalists’ sources are pertinently and 
sufficiently motivated.  A lack of such a guarantee is as such a breach of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
